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THE

TREATY

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BETWEEN

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Her Majesty

AND THE

STATES-GENERAL,

For securing the Succession to the Crown
of *Great-Britain*, and for settling the
Barrier for the States-General against
France, Consider'd.

The Second Edition.



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*The Treaty of the Succession, con-
sider'd, &c.*

THE Treaty of the Succession and Bar-
rier is every day talk'd of in such a
manner, that one may reasonably con-
clude, those who talk of it have no
distinct Idea, what is the Foundation and Pur-
port of it.

As the great Efforts jointly made by *England*
and *Holland* have principally contributed to res-
cue their Liberties and the Protestant Interest
from the Oppression of *France*, so the only way
to obtain a safe Peace, and secure the Blessings
of it, is for the two Maritime Powers to come
to a good Understanding, and preserve a perfect
Friendship with one another. If this be done,
they will have such a true Strength at Sea as to
fear nothing on that Part, and the Protestant In-
terest will always maintain its due Weight in
Europe.

The two great Points that in a manner equally
affect both these Countries, and that, so visibly,
that no one who speaks sincerely can mistake,
are, That the States may be secure against *France*
by a strong Barrier in the *Spanish Netherlands*;
and That *England* may be secure in a Protestant

Succession to the Crown in case of the Death of the Queen without Issue.

If the *Dutch* want such a Barrier, *England* will soon be cut off from the Continent. On the other side, if *England* be subject to a Prince educated, supported, and directed by *France*, the Maritime Power is broken, and *Holland* will soon be swallow'd up.

This is plain matter of Fact; and consequently the first wise Step that can be taken towards making a good Peace, is to settle a Treaty between these two Protestant Powers, by which these two great Points of the Barrier and Succession, might be fix'd with their mutual Guaranty.

If *England* should let slip the first Opportunity, of engaging her Protestant Neighbours to become Guarantees of the Protestant Succession, or having done it should be deluded by any fallacious *French* Pretence to let go that Hold, it will be a Demonstration she is not in good earnest for a Protestant Succession.

We may be told, that the Protestant Succession is very well secur'd; that we have Acts of Parliament that do it sufficiently; that a great Number of Addresses have declar'd for it; that the Natives of *Britain* are sworn to it; that *France* is weary of the War, and will agree to send away the Pretender; and that it may not be good Sense or Policy to engage a foreign Power in defending our Succession, because we cannot alter it, without their Consent perhaps afterwards.

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But is it possible to be caught with such gross Delusions, or to believe that any Man, who talks at this rate, has any other thing in his meaning but to betray the Protestant Succession to the Pretender?

Are we to be indifferent or at ease in this Point? Is there not a known Popish Competitor, who has publicly insisted upon his Title, and has with open actual Force endeavour'd to take Possession; who is harbour'd in *France*, when an actual Treaty for a Peace with *France* is set on foot, and no one Attempt (that is heard of) is yet made to remove him from thence? When there is a known Party of Men in the Kingdom, who disown the Title of the Possessor; and when it is plain that the most powerful Prince in *Europe*, and one who has made War for so many Years with both the Maritime Powers, is the publick Supporter of his Pretences, and the nearest Neighbour to both Countries: Is this a time to leave things to Chance, or to apprehend lest we should make the Protestant Succession too secure from being disappointed, by calling for the Aid of a Foreign Protestant State, in case of any future Danger?

Let it be consider'd, that there is no other way, whereby we can safely and reasonably strengthen our Protestant Succession, but by Foreign Alliances: We see manifestly how the Case stands with respect to the Enemies to that Succession. Our Constitution will not consist with a Standing Army: *France* on the other side cannot be without one; and the Genius and Temper

per of that Nation is such, that it cannot suffer such a Force to be unactive; so that we must be always a ready Prey, or at least hourly expos'd to Affronts. But by making a wise Alliance with a neighbouring Protestant Power, for whom by the same Treaty we make such a wise Provision, that they not only may, but must always maintain a gallant well-disciplin'd Protestant Army engag'd to support this Succession, we may reasonably hope that *France* will be kept in some respect, and that the Pretender will not think that he may disturb us with Impunity, as often as our Naval Force may be by any Accident out of the way.

This may perhaps suffice at present to say with respect to the Succession: let us in a few words consider what may be said as to the Barrier.

It has been the concurrent Opinion of all *Europe*, *French* as well as *Spaniards* and the Empire, that if the *French* become Masters of the *Low-Countries*, it will be impossible for the States to subsist. It is as demonstrably evident, that *Spain* cannot, or at least will not, while the *Spanish Netherlands* are in their own hands, be at the Expence of maintaining effectually this Barrier: It is as evident, that unless this Barrier be really firm and effectual, all the Princes concern'd do but deceive themselves; and the Conclusion will be, that it will fall a Prey to *France*, as has been plain by Experience from the time of the *Pyrenean Treaty*.

Time with Experience very dearly bought, have produc'd several Expedients, which have
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contributed towards bringing this Treaty to bear so far as related to the Barrier. The Grand Alliance in the first place; the Preliminary Treaty in the next place; which, tho it failed as to the main Point, by the Treachery of *France*, yet had a very good effect as to the principal Allies, by bringing them to agree with one another as to many important Points, and in particular as to that of the Barrier; which Agreement has at last produced this happy Treaty, which was lately concluded, and has solidly united the two Maritime Powers in the mutual Guaranty of the Succession and Barrier.

The Grand Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King, and the States, *September 7th, 1701.* being the Foundation of this Treaty, it may be proper to set down the Articles of that Alliance, on which this Treaty is grounded, as well in respect to the Barrier, as to the Regulation of Commerce mention'd in the 15th Article of the said Treaty.

ARTICLE V.

The Confederates, in order to the procuring the Satisfaction and Security aforesaid, shall amongst other Things use their utmost endeavours to recover the Provinces of the Spanish Low-Countries, THAT THEY MAY BE A FENCE AND RAMPART, COMMONLY CALL'D A BARRIER, SEPARATING AND DISTANCING FRANCE FROM THE UNITED.

TED-PROVINCES, FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATES-GENERAL, as they have served in all times, until of late, that the most Christian King hath seized them by his Forces, &c.

ARTICLE VI.

It shall be Lawful for his Royal Majesty of Great-Britain, and the States-General, by common Advice, and for the Benefit and Enlargement of the Navigation and Commerce of their Subjects, to seize by their Forces, what Lands and Cities they can, belonging to the Spanish Dominions in the Indies; and whatsoever they shall so take, shall be their own.

ARTICLE VIII.

*It shall not be permitted to either Party, when the War is once begun, to treat of Peace with the Enemy, unless jointly, and with the common Advice of the other Parties; and no Peace shall be made, unless an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction for his Imperial Majesty, and the particular Security of the Kingdoms, Provinces, Dominions, Navigation and Commerce, for his Majesty of Great-Britain, and the States-General, be first obtained; and unless Care be taken by fitting Security, that the Kingdoms of France and Spain shall never come and be united under the same Government; nor that one, and the same Person, shall be King of both Kingdoms;
and*

and particularly, that the French shall never get into the possession of the Spanish-Indies; neither shall they be permitted to sail thither on the account of Traffick, directly, or indirectly, on any pretence whatsoever: And lastly, unless full Liberty be granted unto the Subjects of the King of Great-Britain, and the States-General, to exercise and enjoy all the same Privileges, Rights, Immunities and Franchises, of Commerce by Sea and Land; in Spain, the Mediterranean, and all Lands and Places, which the King of Spain last deceas'd did possess, at the time of his Death, as well in Europe as elsewhere, which they used and enjoy'd; or which the Subjects of both or either of them, by any Right acquir'd by Treaties, Agreements, Customs, or any other way whatsoever, might have used and enjoy'd before the Death of the late King of Spain.

ARTICLE IX.

At the time that the said Transaction or Peace shall be making, the Confederates shall agree amongst themselves about all the Things, that they shall think necessary for maintaining the Navigation and Commerce of the Subjects of his Majesty of Great-Britain, and the States-General, in the Lands and Dominions they may acquire, and that were possessed by the last deceas'd King of Spain; and also in what manner the States-General may be secured by the aforesaid Fence or Barrier.

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It will be likewise necessary to set down here the 22^d, 23^d, and 29th Articles of the Preliminary Treaty, concluded at the *Hague* in *May*, 1709. Sign'd by the Ministers of the Emperor, *Spain*, the Queen and the States, some Months before the Treaty for the Barrier, and the Succession, was concluded.

ARTICLE XXII.

And as to the States-General, his Majesty shall yield, and make over to them, in the most express Terms, that shall be judged proper, the Place of Furnes, with the Fumer Ambacht, or District belonging to the same; the Fort of Kenock being therein included; Menin with its Verge, Ypres with its Castellany, and Dependencies, which from henceforward shall be Bailleu, Warneton, Commines, Werwick, Popperinguen, and what depends on the Places abovemention'd; (the Town and Castellany of Cassel remaining to his most Christian Majesty :) Lille with its Castellany, (the Town and Government of Douay excepted;) Condé and Maubeuge with all their Dependencies, the whole in such Condition as the said Places are at present: and particularly with the Cannon, Artillery, and Ammunitions of War therein, to serve with the rest of the Spanish Netherlands, for the Barrier of the said States-General, upon which they may agree with the said King Charles, according

according to the Tenor of the Grand Alliance, as well with regard to the Garisons which the said States-General shall maintain therein, as to all other things in the Spanish Netherlands; and particularly as to their having in Propriety and Sovereignty the upper Quarter of Guelderland, according to the Fifty second Article of the Treaty of Munster in the Year 1648. as from time to time they shall think fit. But it is to be understood, that if there is a general Magazine in Tournay, the quantity and quality of the Artillery and Ammunition to be left in the said Places, shall be agreed upon.

ARTICLE XXIII.

His most Christian Majesty shall also deliver up all the Towns, Forts, and Places, which he shall have possessed himself of in the Spanish Netherlands, in the condition they are now in, with their Cannon, Artillery, and Warlike Stores. But it is to be understood, that if since the Troops of the most Christian King entered Namur, any Magazine has been erected, or Stores of Artillery and Ammunition laid up in that Town and Castle more than for their defence, they shall be removed by the Officers of his most Christian Majesty, in concert with those of the States-General, at the time of Evacuation,

which shall not on this account be retarded, but shall be done within the time that shall be limited. The whole on this express Condition, that the Roman Catholick Religion shall be maintained in all the said Places to be deliver'd up, and in their Dependencies, in the same manner as it is now established there; except that the Garisons of the States may exercise their own Religion, as well in the Places yielded and made over for enlarging the Barrier, as in the Places of the Spanish Netherlands, that are to be restored.

ARTICLE XXIX.

And for what relates to the Garisons, which on the part of the States General, are now, or may be put hereafter into the Town of Huy, the Cittadel of Liege, and the Town of Bonn, they shall remain there, till it is agreed otherwise with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire.

By the abovemention'd Twenty second Article of the Preliminary Treaty, it is expressly stipulated, that the States-General shall keep Garisons in the Towns which are to be yielded by *France*, and which are specified in this Article; and their Pretensions to the upper Quarter of *Guel-derland*

derland are likewise asserted and allowed.

By the next Article, the Towns belonging to the *Spanish Netherlands* at the Death of King *Charles*, and which since that time had been seiz'd by *France*, are to be deliver'd up to the States for them to keep Garisons in them.

And by the last of these Articles, the States are to keep Garisons in *Huy*, *Liege*, and *Bonn*, till it is agreed otherwise with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire. So that it appears plainly that the *Dutch* had by these Articles secur'd to themselves their Barrier, with the Consent of their Allies, pursuant to the ninth Article of the Grand Alliance; and that by the Treaty of Succession and Barrier, which was made some Months after the above-mention'd Treaty, her Majesty agrees only to support the States in such a sufficient Barrier, as had been yielded to them before by all the Allies, under such Regulations as are necessary both to preserve it, and to secure our Commerce in the *Low-Countries*; engaging them at the same time, pursuant to the Address of both Houses of Parliament in 1708. to become Guarantees of the Protestant Succession: which Advice has been repeated by the House of Lords in this present Session.

Neither

Neither can it be objected that the Preliminary Treaty is of no Force, the *French* having refus'd to sign it. For tho that is true so far as it relates to *France*; yet the Ministers of the Allies having sign'd it, and it having been approv'd by their respective Masters, it is obligatory as to all the Stipulations contain'd in it, which relate purely and solely to the said Powers, and in which *France* is in no ways concern'd, more especially when such Stipulations are the Consequence of former Engagements, as these Articles are of the Grand Alliance.

It being therefore evident by what goes before, that this Treaty is founded upon the Grand Alliance, and conformable to the Concessions made to the States by the Emperor and the King of *Spain* in the Preliminary Treaty; I shall now proceed to shew,

1. That the Towns in which the *Dutch* are to have Garisons, are no more than what are necessary to make the Barrier effectual.

2. That the States, by having Garisons in those Towns, cannot by virtue of this Treaty, ty, molest, disturb, or any way influence the Trade of *Britain* to the *Low-Countries*.

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As to the first Point, it is notorious that this Barrier is weaker than what was left to *Spain* by the *Pyrenean Treaty*; and it is as well known that the Insufficiency of that Barrier, and the Acquisitions the *French* made by that Treaty, gave them such a footing in the *Low-Countries*, that laid the first Foundation of their Power on that side: so that no one who is really concern'd to see the *Netherlands* effectually secur'd against the Encroachments of *France*, can be so absurd as to think this Barrier too extensive for that purpose, which at the same time is less than that, under favour of which the *French* acquir'd most of the Dominions in *Flanders*, which they were possess'd of at the Beginning of the present War.

And as it is of absolute Necessity that the States should have a sufficient Barrier, so it is of no less Necessity they should have a secure and open Communication with their Garisons: it is requisite therefore for that End, that they should have Garisons in the Castle of *Ghent*, and in *Dendermonde*; nor would the Castle of *Ghent* alone have been sufficient. For should the *French*, in concert with the People of the Country, who are Papists and addicted to their Interest, by Treachery or Surprize, make themselves Masters of *Dendermonde*,

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as they did of the Castle of *Ghent* in 1708. they would easily become absolutely Masters of the *Scheld*, the Castle of *Ghent* being so weak, and the Town very much inclin'd to the *French*; and consequently the *Dutch* would not only be entirely cut off from their Communication with their own Garisons, but likewise from any Succours that can be sent them from *England* by the way of *Ostend*.

But it is objected by some, That allowing a Barrier to be necessary, and that granted in the present Treaty to be no stronger than is requisite; yet the Territories and Revenues assign'd the States for maintaining their Barrier are too large and opulent, and may give them such an Over-balance of Riches and Power as may in time prove formidable to their Neighbours. This Objection will be found of no Weight. For whoever will consider, that if the *Spaniards* with the whole Revenues of the *Netherlands* were not able to secure that Country from being over-run; it is not to be thought, that a Million of Livres *per Annum* over and above the Revenues of those Barrier Towns only, that were not in possession of the late King of *Spain* at his Death, can possibly defray the necessary Encrease of Expence, which the States must be at to repair and keep up the Fortifications, to pay the Garisons, and provide Magazines,
and

and all other Warlike Necessarys, to cover that whole Country from the Insults of the Enemy.

As to the second Point, which is to be prov'd, That the *Dutch* by having Garisons in these Towns, cannot by this Treaty molest, disturb, or any ways influence the *British* Trade in the *Low-Countries*. It is to be observ'd, That the *Dutch* by this Treaty are to have nothing but the Military Power in the Places, where they are to have Garisons; the Sovereignty as to all Rights Civil and Ecclesiastical being expressly reserv'd to King *Charles* by the ninth Article, and that, as well in the Towns that were in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of King *Charles* the Second, as in those that are to be yielded by *France*: by which, the States have debar'd themselves from doing any Acts of Sovereignty either Civil or Ecclesiastical, even in those Towns of which they are to have the Revenues: and they are likewise by the fifteenth Article absolutely ty'd up from any Pretence of disturbing our Trade in the *Low-Countries*, being on the contrary oblig'd to assist in maintaining the Commerce of both Nations upon the same Foot.

The fifteenth Article of this Treaty is founded upon the fourteenth, fifteenth and seventeenth Articles of the Treaty of *Munster*, and pursuant to the Grand Alliance.

By the fourteenth Article of the Treaty of *Munster* between the King of *Spain* and the States, it is agreed, That the Rivers of the *Scheld* as well as the Canals of *Sas*, *Zwin*, and the other Out-lets to the Sea on that side, shall be kept closed on the side of the States.

By the fifteenth Article, the Vessels and Merchandizes coming in or going out thro the Harbours of *Flanders*, shall be charg'd by the King of *Spain* with all such Imposts and Duties as are rais'd upon the Merchandizes going and coming along the *Scheld*, and other Canals mention'd in the foregoing Article.

By the seventeenth Article, the Subjects and Inhabitants of the Country belonging to the said States General, shall have the same Security, and Liberty in the Countries of the said King, which has been granted to the Subjects of *Great Britain* by the last Treaty of Peace, and secret Articles made with the Constable of *Castile*.

So that by these Articles the Trade of *Holland* to *Spain*, as well as to the *Low-Countries*, was settled upon the same Terms by the above-mention'd Treaty, as that between *England* and the *Spanish* Dominions: and upon this Foot it continu'd till the Death of the late King of *Spain*; and pursuant to this it is directly stipulated by the Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance, That the
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Subjects of *Great Britain* and of the States, should enjoy the same Liberty and Privileges in Trade to *Spain* and the *Spanish* Dominions, as they had at the time of the Death of King *Charles II.* of *Spain*: and such further Care was taken by the said Grand Alliance, to keep the Trade of *England* and *Holland* to the *Spanish* Dominions upon an equal Foot, that tho by the sixth Article a Liberty was given to either Nation of conquering, in Concert with one another, any part of the *Spanish West-Indies*, and that each of them should keep all the Places they should take; yet by the ninth Article it is stipulated, that at the negotiating or making of Peace, they shall agree upon all that is necessary for establishing the Trade of both Nations, in the very Places they may have taken, that did belong to the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of King *Charles II.*

What has been said does fully prove, that the Towns in which the States are to have Garisons, are no more than what are necessary to make their Barrier effectual; that by having Garisons in those Towns, the States cannot, by virtue of this Treaty, give any Disturbance to the *British* Trade in the *Low-Countries*; and that the Regulation of Commerce to the *Spanish* Dominions between the two Nations, is merely pursuant to the Grand Alliance.

But it may be objected, That tho we have no reason to apprehend any Molestation of our Trade from the *Dutch*, as long as we continue Friends; yet in case of a Rupture with us, the *Dutch* will have so much Power by their Garisons, as to put a stop to our Trade in the *Low-Countries*.

This Objection supposes an absolute Dissolution of this Treaty; but we are so happy in this respect, that even in case of a Rupture with us, the *Dutch* would hardly venture, either by their Garisons of *Ghent*, *Dendermond*, *Newport*, or of any other Places, to interrupt the *British* Trade in those Countries. For any Attempt of that nature would be an Invasion upon the King of *Spain's* Sovereignty, as is expressly reserv'd to him by this Treaty: And *Britain* being in Friendship with that Prince, we should have a Right to demand Reparation of him for any Violence committed by the *Dutch* on our Trade in his Dominions; which the States would be oblig'd to redress, unless they resolv'd to break with the King of *Spain* also, whose own particular Interest, as well as that of the *Low-Countries*, is so essentially concern'd to protect the Trade passing thro the Harbours of *Flanders*, that he will never connive at any Encroachments of the *Dutch* in that respect. And no body can imagine that they would, for the sake of incommoding our Commerce in the *Low-Countries*, be so imprudent as to bring

bring the House of *Austria* upon them, and thereby lose their whole *Spanish* Trade, at a time that they are in War with *Britain*.

Having thus endeavour'd to set this Treaty in a true Light, I shall conclude with this Remark only, That when *Britain*, *Holland*, and the House of *Hanover* were rejoicing in the happy Conclusion of this Treaty, and endeavouring to carry it on, by engaging every one of the Allies in it, and even *France* it self, if she intended in good earnest to have a Peace, some strange Changes have happen'd, of which it is hard to give a clear Account. But so it is, that this Treaty for securing the Protestant Succession, lies so much in the way of some favourite Purpose, that right or wrong Objections must be made to it; Objections of such a nature, that one would not have thought they could have come from the Persons in whose Mouths they are met with, nor from any body else but utter Strangers to the Treaty. But it is time to break off these melancholy Thoughts, and to comfort our selves, by calling to mind what the Queen has been pleas'd to declare in her Speech at the opening of this Session, and since by her Message to both Houses of Parliament: ' That she looks upon the Interest of her Allies as inseparable from her own: That her chief Concern is, that the Protestant Religion, and the Laws and Liberties of these Nations may be continu'd to us, by securing
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‘ the Succession to the Crown, as it is limited
 ‘ by Parliament to the House of *Hanover* ;
 ‘ and that her Plenipotentiaries have begun,
 ‘ in pursuance of their Instructions, to con-
 ‘ cert the most proper ways of procuring a
 ‘ just Satisfaction to all in Alliance with her,
 ‘ according to their several Treaties.’

APPENDIX.

Extract of Cardinal Mazarine's
 MEMORIAL to the French
Plenipotentiaries at Mun-
ster. Dated the 20th of
January, 1646.

I PROMIS'D you, Gentlemen, in my
 last, to give you at large my Reasons
 for thinking it would be very much for
 the Service of this Crown, to consent to the
 withdrawing its Arms out of *Catalonia* and
Roussillon, if the King of *Spain* would yield
 to us the *Low Countries* and the County of
Burgundy, either by favour of a Marriage, or
 for

for an Exchange, taking care at the same time to obtain all the Advantages and Security we can for the *Catalans*, according to what I have said in several of my former Letters. I will now make good my Promise, being more at leisure than I was last Week, and give you my Thoughts of this Matter, desiring you would also give me yours. First, the Acquisition of the *Low-Countries* would be such a Defence to *Paris*, as would be impregnable; and it might then be truly call'd the Heart of *France*, and would be situated in the safest Place of the Kingdom. Our Frontier would then be extended quite to *Holland*, and on the side of *Germany* (from whence also we have reason to fear) to the *Rhine*, by keeping *Lorraine* and *Alsace*, and by the possession of *Luxemburg* and the County of *Burgundy*.

In the next place, by this means we should get out of this War with so much Advantage and Reputation, that the most malicious would be put to it to find fault with it. All the Blood and Treasure it has cost, would, by the most difficult Persons, be allow'd to have been well employ'd, if they saw the antient Kingdom of *Austrasia* annex'd to this Crown, which has furnish'd the Princes that were Masters of it not only with means to resist *France*, but to give it a great deal of Trouble, as every body knows.

Thirdly, Those who are obnoxious to the Government, the Factious and Discontented, losing

losing by this means their Place of Retreat, would lose the opportunity of embroiling Affairs, and making Cabals with the Assistance of the Enemy; it being observable, that all the Parties against the State, and all the Conspiracies have ordinarily been form'd in the *Low Countries*, in *Lorain*, and in *Sedan*.

Fourthly, The Power of *France* would become formidable to its Neighbours, and particularly to the *English*, who are naturally jealous of its Greatness, and who will let slip no Opportunity to hurt or lessen it, if a considerable Accession to it, does not put an end to all their Hopes of succeeding in such Designs. And one might be assur'd, if they know such a Negotiation was carrying on, and their intestine Quarrels did not embarrass them to the degree they do, there is nothing they would not hazard to hinder its taking Effect.

The States would have more regard to us, and would become more tractable than they are. The Catholick Religion would receive a great Advantage and Support from it in their Dominions; the Catholicks being not so much persecuted there for their Religion, as for their Affection and Adherence to *Spain*.

There is no reason to apprehend, if measures were rightly taken, and well conducted, that the States would be for crossing such an Accommodation, since they would find their own Interest in it no less than we; for then
they

they might be for ever sure of enjoying a profound Peace, without being at the excessive Charges they have hitherto : for then all talk of a Truce would be at an end, and the *Spaniards* giving up *Flanders* to the King, all occasions of War would cease.

Besides, tho the *Spaniards*, whose Interest it is to lessen the Power of this Crown, should give us the *Low-Countries* ; they would no doubt give up to the States all the Rights and Pretensions they have to the United Provinces : and *France* consenting thereto, and ratifying it in the most solemn Form, and as should be most to their Satisfaction, the States would be able to secure to themselves a lasting Tranquillity, with all the Advantages that an universal Commerce ordinarily brings with it, the rather because the Situation of their Country is such, and so well fortify'd both by Art and Nature, that it will always be useless to endeavour to maké any Progress there, and imprudent to embark in such Designs.

There is nothing but intestine Dissensions, which kindle easily in Peace, can disturb their Quiet ; which is a Reason why *France* should prefer Acquisitions on this side to all others, because without any Breach of the Laws of Friendship or its Alliance, it may in time make notable Advantage of their Divisions.

And whoever shall examine, according to the Rules of good Politicks, the Affairs of
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the States, will certainly find, that they can't very easily subsist, if in the Peace that is treating, their Security against *Spain* is not provided for, especially since the Prince of *Orange* is not only advanc'd in years, but subject to such Infirmities, that his Life begins to be despair'd of; particularly since 'tis known, he is so threaten'd with a Dropsie, that in the Consultations that have been held at *Paris* by his Order, they have unanimously been of Opinion, that it would be very difficult for him to avoid it.

And this ought extremely to oblige us to make an Accommodation with *Spain*, since the Death of this Prince would on all accounts be very prejudicial to this Crown; the Princess of *Orange* being hated to that degree, that 'tis thought the *Dutch* would send her away, and Prince *William* but Young, and, as 'tis said, given more to his Pleasures than to Business, and consequently less fit to recover the Credit of his Fathers, if they should lose him.

'Tis likewise thought the States would immediately set about the lessening his Authority, not only because they are very uneasy under that of his Father, but because of the Jealousy they have conceiv'd upon the Marriage he has made in *England*, and strict Understanding he is in with *France* since the Death of Cardinal *Richelieu*.

If *France* has any thing to apprehend from the House of *Austria*, it can be only on the side

side of *Flanders*, and on that of *Germany*; as well on account of the Union they can make of their Forces, these two Countries being contiguous, as because, whatever Advantages we may have over them, one good Success got by them either by the Surprise of any Place upon the *Soam*, or by a Battle, or any other way, might put *Paris* which is so near, into such a Consternation, as there was upon the taking of *Corbie*, and upon the loss of the Battle of *Honnecourt*, and oblige us to withdraw, or at least lessen the Troops we have in distant Parts, for example in *Catalonia* and *Italy*, and leave those Places naked, as we did for *Corbie*; which made us raise the Siege of *Dole*, which was upon the Point of Surrendering, altho we were then engag'd in no War on the side of *Spain*.

The Acquisitions of the *Low-Countries* delivers us for ever from these two Fears; there would be no more any Junction of the Enemies Troops, since *Spain* would have nothing on that side; and our Frontier being every way extended to the *Rhine*, we should be so far from fearing any thing from the Emperor, that he would find himself oblig'd to cultivate carefully a good Union with us: and this would not contribute a little to the Separation, which *France* has reason to wish for, of the *Spanish* Branch of the House of *Austria*, from that of *Germany*.

In my Opinion 'tis in point of Prudence most advisable to leave those Parts to the Enemy that they can easiest retake. 'Tis certain, that as 'tis purely Necessity that obliges them to make Peace, fearing a greater Evil by the Continuance of the War, whenever they shall think themselves in a Condition to renew the War, with any hopes of Success (which they will much flatter themselves with, from the long Minority of the King) they won't want Pretexts for it, let us take what Precautions we can ; and in that Case, altho we should by a Peace remain Masters of what we possess at present in *Catalonia*, and in the *Low-Countries*, 'twill be much easier for the Enemy, by making great Preparations of Men and Mony, and by the Correspondence they will cultivate in *Catalonia*, (where the best Place we have, is the Love of the People, which is not to be much depended on) to recover that Principality, either by Force or Intelligence, or by some Advantage gain'd on the side of *Flanders*, than to recover the *Low-Countries*, when they have once quitted them ; or to make any Progress in *Languedoc*, since they would then be oppos'd by all the Forces of *France*, which would be then more powerful than ever she was before, which would not be diverted by those of *Flanders*, which puts us in so much pain for *Paris*.

And

And this, in my Opinion, would be the true Security for the Peace to be lasting, which we should find in our own Strength. For things being brought to this, it would be Madness in the Enemy to think ever of a Rupture with this Kingdom. For if we consider the Advantages we should have in *Germany*, or the old Friendships and Alliances we shall preserve there, and the New ones we might make; or how much the Emperor will be weaken'd by the Conclusion of the Peace; we have not only nothing to fear on that side, but there is Reason to believe, that tho we had not hinder'd the Emperor from assisting the *Spaniards*, as we shall by this Peace, his own Interest, and his Fear of our Forces would prevent his taking part in any Attempts the *Spaniards* might make. And thus having nothing to employ our Troops on the side of *Flanders* and *Germany*, what they would be capable of doing, if we were to employ them only in *Italy* and *Spain*, may be judg'd by the Progress they make at present in those two Provinces, altho the King of *Spain* is active to oppose us in one of them, and we make our greatest Efforts, and with an incredible Expence, on the side of *Flanders* and *Germany*, where our best Troops usually serve. One of the Reasons by which the ablest Ministers of *Spain* flatter themselves, they shall get out of the Difficulties, which the Condi-

tions

tions of Peace, which ever way they are turn'd, will throw them into, is the great Hopes they have, that a Peace hindering us from purging *France* of its ill Humours, intestine Divisions will soon arise, of which they expect to make Advantage. Now 'tis certain the *Spaniards* can't give any considerable Assistance to any Faction in the State, but on the side of *Flanders*, where they have Troops always in readiness for it, which are the more to be feared, because they are *most fit for Service*. When the *Spaniards* formerly persuaded the Duke of *Orleans* to carry the War into *Languedoc*, altho this is a Province contiguous to *Spain*, they could give him no Succour on that side, but they did it from *Flanders*. And in the last Treaty with the late Monsieur de *Grand*, every body knows all the Assistance was to come from the *Low-Countries*.

The People of *Flanders*, who suffer prodigiously by their Country's having been so long the Seat of War, would like such a Change so much, that we can't but doubt, we should soon gain their Love, when they found themselves out of danger of any Invasion, and like to enjoy for ever a profound Tranquillity, with all sorts of Conveniences and Advantages, under the Dominion of this Crown.

And our Expence would be so far from being increas'd by the Acquisition of so many

ny Places, (besides that we might receive considerable Assistance from them, without laying any Burden on the People) that we might save a great Part of the Expence we are at for Garisons in *Picardy*, and might raze most of the Places, and the others would be kept with a small Charge: for bordering upon the States, it can't be thought, they would ever engage to attack or surprize us, for fear of provoking a Power so much Superiour to them, and which would so many ways be able to make them feel its Resentments.

'Twould be too tedious to enter into a Detail of all the Conveniences and Advantages we should have in Trade and other-ways, by so important an Acquisition, and by the Port of *Mardick* and *Dunkirk*, which is the best in the Ocean, and most considerable for us, * *with respect both to the States and to England.*

Perhaps I may be mistaken; but I dare say the *Spaniards* would consent rather to give us the *Low Countries* and *Burgundy* for *Catalonia* and *Rousillon*, with the Hopes of recovering *Portugal*, when the Truce is expired, without the Marriage with the King, than with it, giving for a Dowry the greatest Part of what they are to yield to us.

* *Pour nous approcher de Messieurs les Etats & pour regarder comme il faut l'Angleterre.*

My Reason is, that all the Advantage they would have from this Alliance at present, would be to satisfy a certain Appearance, and the Vanity of leaving to us by way of Dowry, the Conquests we have made. But as this would only save a little their Reputation with the Common People, it would be found, that we should have all *the Solid*; and the Infanta being marry'd to his Majesty, we might pretend to the Succession of *Spain*, whatever Renunciation be made: and this would not be a very remote Prospect, since there is only the Life of the Prince her Brother, that can put us by it.

F I N I S.

